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Abstract 
Stable, higher income democracies often have both a strong middle class 
and relatively low levels of inequality. In contrast, lower and middle 
income countries with highly unequal patterns of income distribution and 
stratified social structures often have a weak middle class, more social 
conflict and a tendency to populist and/or authoritarian politics. This paper 
investigates, for a sample of more than 120 countries, some empirical 
correlations between the size of the middle class and the following set of 
variables: the level (mean) of per capita income and wealth, the degree of 
inequality (Gini coefficients) of per capita income and wealth, the level 
and composition of public expenditure, the share of small and medium 
size enterprises in employment and output and an indicator of democracy. 
Our results show that in high income economies the relative size of the 
middle class (using a broad definition of deciles 3 to 9) is near 6 
percentage points higher than the share of the middle class in low income 
countries, suggesting a positive relationship between the level of economic 
development measured by per capita income levels and the share of the 
middle class. However, the relationship between the share in income of the 
middle class and the level of per capita income is non-linear and shows 
more dispersion for low and middle income countries with per capita 
incomes below US$ 10,000 than for rich economies. We found weak 
correlations between the share of the middle class and the level of public 
spending and the relative size of the small and medium size enterprises 
(measured both as shares of total employment and total output).  When we 
correlate an index of democracy and the middle class shares we find little 
or no correlation between both variables except for the group of high-
income economies. 
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I. Introduction 
The traditional concern of development policy has been on the poor. The 
analysis of broader social structures, “social classes” such as the middle 
class and the rich are more the staple of work by sociologists and political 
scientists rather than economists. However, this is starting to change. It is 
apparent that as income per capita increases people will leave poverty and 
enter the pool of what we call the middle class. In the last two decades or 
so this process has been taking place in China, India, and some countries 
in Latin America. The middle class is typically identified with a large 
range of occupations and professions and includes people holding 
professional degrees such as academics, lawyers, engineers, doctors as 
well as clergymen and lower-level occupations different from manual 
workers. The “lower middle class” (people whose incomes are closer to 
the poverty line) can be a source of policy concern as it is a segment closer 
and more vulnerable to fall in poverty. At the same time, individuals in the 
upper ranges of the middle class can eventually become “rich” propelled 
by higher education levels, and probably helped also by good luck and 
social connections. A traditional employer of the middle class is the 
government (ministries, the bureaucracy of the state, public enterprises, 
decentralized agencies, etc). Also the sector of small and medium size 
enterprises is often assumed to be a source of employment and incomes 
for the middle class. Thus, both the state and the market can originate a 
middle class segment in society. 
In this paper we test empirically these intuitions. The middle class 
has also some distinctive expenditure patterns and aspirations. They 
increasingly demand better quality education, health care, tourism and 
housing. Although neoclassical economic theory assumes that individual’s 
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welfare is chiefly dependent on personal income levels (and consumption) there is evidence that people 
cares also about relative incomes.  
The new theory of happiness (Layard, 2005; Graham, 2007; and others) underscores this point. 
Of course, older generation economists such as Thorstein Veblen and James Duesenburry noted 
this point long ago. In the popular imagination middle class people is often characterized as 
individuals concerned with other people’s standard of living and relative welfare (“close to the 
Jones but far from the Smiths”).1 
The interest on the middle class comes also from political economy considerations. Policy-
makers and international organizations care about the need of mobilizing and sustaining political 
support for certain economic policies. In the 1990s the dominant model was market-oriented 
economic reforms in developing countries and former socialist economies. More recently, concerns 
on social equity and distributive justice are becoming increasingly important (see Solimano, Aninat 
and Birdsall, 2000). This new emphasis on the middle class arises from the observation that stable, 
higher income democracies often have both a strong middle class and relatively low levels of 
inequality. In contrast, countries with highly unequal patterns of income distribution and stratified 
social structures often have a weak middle class. The political correlate of this system is often 
social conflict and volatile and populist politics (see Solimano, 2006 for the Latin American 
experience).2 Thus, a stronger and more stable middle class is often considered as a stabilizing 
factor in politics and economics.3 A feature typical of concentrated income distributions is that 
mean income is often greater than median income. As the middle class is more grouped towards the 
mean, (in contrast with the median affecting political preferences in the median voter theorem) part 
of the middle class will not be as influential in shaping political preferences as it would be the case 
in a more egalitarian society. The empirical evidence is favorable to this hypothesis. In fact, 
Easterly (2000) has shown, based on cross country and panel econometric regressions, that a higher 
share of income for the middle class (and lower ethnic polarization) are empirically associated with 
higher income, higher growth, more education and other favorable development outcomes. It is 
important to device education, health, housing and social security policies that consider the 
demands and specificities of the middle class such as its quest for upward mobility and its role as a 
stabilizing segment in society. 
This paper is organized in three sections besides this Introduction. Section 2 identifies the 
main economic and political economy variables that are bound to be correlated with the middle 
class. This refers to the level and inequality of per capita income and net wealth, the size of 
government and composition of public expenditure, the size of small and medium size enterprises 
and the degree of democracy in a country. Section 3 assembles a data base for these variables for a 
sample of 129 countries and studies the patterns of empirical correlations between the middle class 
and a set of determinants for a cross-section of countries grouped by income per capita levels and 
regions. The paper closes in section 4 with conclusions from the analysis. 
                                                     
1
 See Cashell (2007), Daly and Wilson (2006) and Birdsall et.al. (2000), Solimano (1998 and 2005). 
2
 Policy reversal toward policies of nationalization is already taking place in some countries (i.e Venezuela and Bolivia in the Latin 
American context). It is a serious possibility that this and other anti-market policy moves take hold in other countries as well. This 
policy U-turn may be related to a relative neglect of the middle class both as a potential beneficiary of fiscal and social policies as 
well as a very relevant political actor in any democracy. 
3
 The traditional channel for instability to be transmitted to lower growth is through private investment a variable that is very sensitive 
to instability and political polarization associated with weak middle classes and high inequality of income and wealth. 
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II. Economic correlates of the 
middle class: empirical results 
In this section we will investigate some empirical correlations between a 
set of variables, fundamentally of economic and political economy nature, 
which we postulate have a relationship with the middle class: 
a) Level of per capita income and per capita wealth.4 
b) Inequality of income and inequality of wealth 
c) Level and composition of public expenditure. 
d) Share of small and medium size enterprises in employment and 
output. 
e) Democracy  
Income per capita and wealth 
We can expect that the relative size of the middle class has a positive 
correlation with the level of per capita income of the country. As 
mentioned before, in a growing economy income per capita increases 
and people will leave poverty and go into the ranks of the middle 
class. In addition, social mobility should increase in a dynamic 
economy with individuals moving up (or down) in the income and 
social status ladders.  In addition, there is an important empirical 
regularity – confirmed in this paper – that middle and higher per capita 
 
                                                     
4
 In what follows, “wealth”, “net wealth” and “net worth” are used indistinctly. See Annex A. 
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income countries have, on average, a larger share of the middle class in real income than poor 
income countries. At this stage, we avoid postulating a causality running from the middle class to 
growth and income per capita and rather postulate a correlation. 
Also the size of the middle class is correlated with the level of net wealth composed by 
physical and financial assets, housing, and debts.5 Richer economies, say those with higher net 
wealth per capita, also have a larger middle class. In addition, richer economies have often deeper 
and more sophisticated capital markets and therefore more possibilities to acquire financial and 
other assets by the middle class.6 Also the possibilities to diversify portfolios in richer economies 
are greater than in lower income economies. 
Inequality 
As mentioned before, we expect that countries with lower inequality of income and wealth (less 
concentrated income and wealth distributions) have larger middle classes, as income is distributed 
more evenly across the population than countries with higher inequality. In general inequality of 
income (and wealth) is characterized by a large share of income (wealth) accruing to the rich and a 
lower share to the middle class and/or the poor.7 However, wealth and income concentration are not 
the same concept, and often wealth is more concentrated than primary incomes.8 The important 
point is that we expect a negative relationship between the degree of concentration in income and 
wealth distribution and the relative size of the middle class in the economy.9 Empirically, we will 
expect that countries with higher (lower) values of the income (and wealth) Gini coefficient have a 
lower (higher) share of the middle class in the personal distribution of income (or wealth). Again 
we will investigate empirically this hypothesis. 
The size of government 
In many countries a main employer of the middle class is government (ministries, state-agencies, 
public enterprises, etc). Then we could expect that the middle class is larger in countries with larger 
governments. In addition, the middle class will be affected by the incidence of the government 
expenditure and the level and composition of taxes.10 In this paper we approximate the size of the 
state by the ratio of government expenditure over GDP but we will look at also the correlations 
between the composition of public spending – particularly social expenditure – and the middle 
class (broad definition and lower and upper middle class segments). 
Small and medium size enterprises (SME) 
The SME is also a source of income and jobs for different groups of the population including the 
middle class. This class besides being identified as a typical employee of the government is also, in 
many countries, an owner (as well as employee) of micro, small and medium size enterprises. In 
this sense we can expect a positive relationship between the relative size of the small and medium 
size enterprise sector in the economy (measured in terms of output and/or employment) and the 
                                                     
5
 See Annex A, for definition and sources of the “Net Worth (wealth) per capita” variable. 
6
 The middle class is often a main owner of housing among other assets (Solimano, 2007). 
7
 See Atkinson (2006). 
8
 See Davies et al. (2006). 
9
 Sometimes a high concentration of income and wealth at the top is sometimes referred as polarization, and we should expect an 
inverse relationship between polarization and the relative size of the middle class. 
10
 López y Torero (2007). Typically, public spending in tertiary education, pensions and public education and health tends to benefit 
the (upper) middle class. Also the level of taxes affects the disposable income of different groups in the population. 
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relative importance of the middle class. Recent empirical evidence shows that, (in relative terms), 
the SME sector is larger in higher income countries than in middle and lower income countries.11  
Democracy 
Political scientists have always emphasized that stable and well consolidated democracies have also 
larger middle classes. In addition, most stable democracies are located in high-income countries. 
Thereby, the level of economic development, democracy and larger middle classes are all variables 
that seem to move together. We shall test these patterns for a large sample in this paper, expecting a 
positive correlation between democracy (using the data set of the multi-country Polity IV project) 
and the relative size of the middle class.  
Empirical results 
In Table 1 we present the average values of the variables used in this study. We have data on levels 
of per capita income, net wealth per person and income distribution (income shares and Gini 
coefficients for income and wealth) for 129 countries. Data of the ratio of public expenditure over 
GDP is available for 93 countries, the democracy index for 126 economies, and the shares of 
SME’s in total employment and output for 72 countries and 35 economies, respectively. The social 
structure of each country is decomposed in three social classes: the poor, the middle class and the 
rich. Our focus is, however, on the middle class. Empirically, the income shares within countries 
for each class are as follows: 
(i) The poor (bottom 1 and 2 deciles) 
(ii) The middle class. As this class encompasses a broad segment of the population we work 
with a “broad definition” (deciles 3 to 9) and with a decomposition of “lower middle class” 
(deciles 3 to 6) and “upper middle class” (deciles 7 to 9) 
(iii) The rich (approximated by the share of the 10th decile).12 
Economies are grouped according to their level of per capita income using the definition of 
the World Bank (Low-Income, Lower-Middle Income, Upper-Middle Income and High-Income) 
and also by regional grouping (see Annex A for a description of country classification). 
The average share of the middle class, (broad definition, MC) for the world economy (129 
countries) is close to 62 percent (data circa 2000). This relative size increases with the level of per 
capita income: the MC share for low-income countries (with a per capita income of less than US$ 
905 in PPP) is 60.4 percent while the share of the middle class in high-income countries (those with 
                                                     
11
 See Ayyagari, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2005). In turn, the SME sector has also lower productivity levels than large companies as 
the capital stock per worker is smaller than for large firms. Accordingly, the real wages paid to the employees in SME tend to be 
lower than in larger firms, thereby affecting incomes of the poor and lower-middle class individuals. 
12
 The standard of living of a person classified as ‘middle class” depends on the average level of income of the country. So in a low 
income country the middle class may correspond to the poor in a high-income economy. Overlaps across countries will occur. Our 
focus for assessing the standard of living of the middle class is within countries distributions rather than on the world (or global) 
income distributions. The global income distribution intends to reflect the distribution of income among all citizens of the world. 
The World Bank (2007) defines the global middle class ranging from U$ 4,000 to U$ 17,000, which corresponds, roughly, to the per 
capita income of Brazil and Italy respectively. It is clear that for many countries, particularly low income and middle income 
countries that the average income of a person belonging to the national middle class is well below the average income of the citizen 
of the global middle class. In fact, upper income people in lower income economies are bound to be only middle income people 
according to the global middle class definition. It is estimated that growth of the global middle class in coming years will be 
concentrated mainly in developing countries and is associated with economy-wide growth, increases in education levels, shifts in 
income distribution and other factors. This is bound to have effects on international trade in goods and services as well as on 
domestic demand. The expenditure patterns of the middle class include demand for durable goods, housing, education and health 
care services, tourism and other (see Milanovic, 2006, and World Bank, 2007). 
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GDP per head above US$ 11, 000) is much higher: 66 percent. In turn, we find that the shares of 
the upper middle class have a narrower range of variation, across countries (varies from 36 in low 
income countries to 37.5 percent in high-income economies) than the shares of the lower middle 
class (the range varies from 24 percent for low-income countries compared to 29 percent for high 
income countries, see Table 1). 
Interestingly the increase in the middle class share in higher income countries (HIC) comes 
along with a decline in the average share of the rich. The income share of the rich (top 10 percent) 
is smaller in high-income economies (on average 25.8 percent) than the corresponding share in 
low-income economies (33.5 percent). Thus it is apparent that high income economies have less 
concentrated income distributions and a larger middle class than middle income and low income 
economies, confirming our basic hypothesis discussed before that high-income economies have 
larger middle classes than poor and middle income countries. The same observation can be drawn 
using the GINI coefficients of income (calculated by the World Bank) and the GINI of wealth 
(computed by UNU-WIDER). In fact, the average (income) GINI for high-income economies is 
0.33 compared to 0.42 for low income economies (and close to 0.43 for middle income countries), 














































TABLE 1  
THE MIDDLE CLASS AND CORRELATES 
(Selected indicators for 129 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income shares Income and Wealth Other Indicators 
Country Group Poor 
(Deciles 1 






















































(% of Total 
Employment) 
SME's Output 
 (% of GDP) 
World Bank's Income-based 
Criterion                            
 Low-Income Economies 6.04 60.41 24.29 36.12 33.55 1 349.10  0.422 3 960.17 0.709 20.00 0.97 36.19 24.00 
 
Lower-Middle-Income 
Economies 5.54 59.94 23.62 36.32 34.51 3 982.84  0.438 11 162.62 0.709 21.63 0.65 38.76 29.41 
 
Upper-Middle-Income 
Economies 5.69 61.21 24.59 36.62 33.10 7 999.65  0.423 20 232.75 0.705 27.22 7.83 51.14 40.79 
  High-Income Economies 7.47 66.67 29.08 37.59 25.85 23 769.67  0.330 89 192.45 0.665 33.49 9.46 63.93 48.77 
World Bank's Regional Criterion                          
 East Asia & Pacific 6.53 62.75 25.77 36.98 30.72 10 006.21  0.391 45 237.73 0.676 21.25 5.87 67.45 35.97 
 
Europe, Central Asia & 
North America 7.72 66.67 29.31 37.35 25.61 15 177.41  0.325 48 801.64 0.668 30.70 5.91 49.98 42.91 
  By OECD Membership                
   OECD countries 7.67 67.05 29.57 37.47 25.28 27 461.19  0.320 96 685.34 0.676 36.02 9.94 67.40 53.63 
     
Non-OECD 
countries 7.75 66.43 29.15 37.28 25.81 6 988.23  0.328 19 080.73 0.664 26.72 3.55 35.06 31.21 
  
By European Union 
Membership                
   EU Members 7.91 67.34 29.98 37.36 24.75 19 773.78  0.313 65 127.29 0.657 36.23 9.46 59.22 48.69 
     Others 7.50 65.91 28.55 37.35 26.59 9 431.95  0.338 30 249.77 0.682 23.34 2.05 35.21 26.52 
 
Latin America & The 
Caribbean 3.64 56.81 20.52 36.29 39.54 5 627.84  0.510 16 457.70 0.743 20.72 3.45 55.94 45.34 
 Middle East & North Africa 6.62 63.64 26.26 37.39 29.71 6 441.90  0.379 19 250.69 0.676 29.49 2.38 -- -- 
 South Asia 7.70 60.21 25.67 34.54 32.12 2 239.84  0.381 7 275.13 0.682 16.76 4.60 -- -- 
  Sub-Saharan Africa 5.10 57.60 21.96 35.63 37.31 1 882.42  0.470 4 615.79 0.729 24.01 0.93 32.66 -- 
All Countries 6.17 61.88 25.27 36.61 31.95 8 596.30  0.405 28 874.90 0.698 26.26 4.02 51.08 42.14 
(Number of Countries included) (129) (129) (129) (129) (129) (127) (129) (129) (129) (93) (126) (72) (35) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007), Davies et al. (2006) (WIDER-UNU Project on World Wealth Distribution), Marshall and Jaggers (2005)(Policy IV 
Project), and Ayyagari et al. (2005) (SME’s Database). See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for each variable. 
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It is important to note that the degree of concentration of wealth is often higher than for 
income. In fact, the average GINI coefficients for wealth (net worth) are 0.66 for high-income 
economies and 0.71 for low income economies. Figure 1 displays Lorenz curves for income and for 
wealth and the former lies closer to the 45 degree (line of full equality) than the Lorenz curve for 
wealth, suggesting that inequality of incomes is less than inequality for wealth using cross country 
data. 
When we consider regional groupings of countries we find some interesting contrasts: Latin 
American and the Caribbean has the lowest average share of the middle class in income (and the 
highest share of the top 10 percent), followed by Africa. Also Latin America has the highest 
inequality indicators measured by both GINI of income and GINI of wealth. This confirms, for 
regions, that inequality and the relative importance of the middle class are inversely correlated. The 
regions with higher shares of the middle class are Europe, Central Asia and North America, 
followed by the Middle East and North Africa and East Asia & Pacific. 
FIGURE 1 
LORENZ CURVES FOR INCOME AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONS 

















Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007) and Davies et al. (2006) [WIDER-UNU 
Project on World Wealth Distribution]. See Annex A for details 
Regarding other variables we find that the size of government expenditure goes up with the 
level of per capita income. Low income and lower middle income countries have a ratio of public 
spending to GDP in the range of 20-21.5 percent whereas the same ratio fluctuates between 27 
percent and 33 percent in upper middle income and high income economies, respectively. Again 
the higher ratio of public expenditure is associated with larger middle classes in high-income 
economies. Also we find a substantially higher share of SME in employment in high-income 
economies (close to 64 percent) compared to around 36 percent for low income countries. Upper 
middle income countries have a corresponding share of SME in employment of 51 percent and 
lower middle income near 39 percent. The differences are smaller for the shares of SMEs in output 
but still the positive correlation with income per capita levels holds. 
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III. Analysis of correlations 
Levels of per capita income and 
per capita wealth  
The coefficient of correlation between the share of the middle class (broad 
definition) and the levels of per capita income in PPP for a sample of 127 
countries is 0.411, (see Table 2). In turn, the correlation of the share of the 
(broad) middle with per capita net worth is somewhat lower (0.346). As 
shown in Figure 2 the scatter diagram of the shares of the middle class 
(broad definition) shows a greater variability across low income and 
middle income countries than in high income economies. The relationship 
between the relative size of the middle class and per capita income levels 
really “stabilizes” for countries with per capita income above US$ 10,000 
or so (high-income economies). In the case of per capita net wealth that 
relation becomes more stable at a threshold of around US$ 50,000, see 
Figure 3. Again the dispersion of MC shares is higher for lower and 













































MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS FOR 129 COUNTRIES 
(Selected indicators for 129 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Shares Income and Wealth Other Indicators 

























































1.000                         Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(129)                         
0 807 1 000                       Middle Class (Broad 
definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (129) (129)                       
0 927 0 956 1 000              Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (129) (129) (129)                     
0 217 0 723 0 489 1 000             Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (129) (129) (129) (129)                   
-0 891 -0 987 -0 986 -0 615 1 000           
Income 
Groups 
Rich (Top Decile) 
(129) (129) (129) (129) (129)                 
0 328 0 411 0 421 0 231 -0 405 1 000          GDP per capita                            
(PPP adjusted) (127) (127) (127) (127) (127) (127)               
-0 954 -0 940 -0 992 -0 460 0 981 -0 402 1 000             Income GINI Index 
(129) (129) (129) (129) (129) (127) (129)             
0 236 0 346 0 333 0 243 -0 330 0 912 -0 316 1 000           Net Worth per capita                 
(PPP adjusted) (129) (129) (129) (129) (129) (127) (129) (129)           
-0 655 -0 676 -0 697 -0 368 0 697 -0 265 0 688 -0 196 1 000         
Income and 
Wealth 
Net Worth GINI Index 
(129) (129) (129) (129) (129) (127) (129) (129) (129)         
0 295 0 359 0 355 0 217 -0 354 0 505 -0 351 0 405 -0 272 1 000       Government Expenses            
(% of GDP) (93) (93) (93) (93) (93) (92) (93) (93) (93) (93)       
0 054 0 025 0 043 -0 025 -0 034 0 253 -0 045 0 212 -0 020 0 211 1 000     Democracy Index (Polity 
IV) (126) (126) (126) (126) (126) (124) (126) (126) (126) (92) (126)     
-0 006 -0 019 -0 017 -0 018 0 016 0 479 0 007 0 420 -0 029 0 222 0 160 1 000   SME's Employment (% of 
total employment) (72) (72) (72) (72) (72) (72) (72) (72) (72) (60) (70) (72)   
-0 031 0 073 0 033 0 187 -0 043 0 565 -0 028 0 546 -0 004 0 188 -0 076 0 698 1 000 
Other 
Indicators 
SME's Output (% of GDP) 
(35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (35) (31) (34) (35) (35) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007), Davies et al. (2006) [WIDER-UNU Project on World Wealth Distribution], Marshall and Jaggers (2005)  
[Polity IV Project], and Ayyagari et al. (2005) [SME's Database]. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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FIGURE 2 
THE MIDDLE CLASS (BROAD DEFINITION) AND GDP PER CAPITA 
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Low-Income Economies [GNIpc < 905 US$] (Mean 60.41%; Variance 0.0022)
Lower-Middle-Income Economies [905US$ < GDPpc < 3595US$] (Mean 59.94%; Variance 0.0045)
Upper-Middle-Income Economies [3596US$ < GDPpc < 11115US$] (Mean 61.21%; Variance 0.0050)
High-Income Economies [GNIpc > 11116US$] (Mean 66.67%; Variance 0.0006)
 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007). See Annex A for details. 
 
FIGURE 3 
THE MIDDLE CLASS (BROAD DEFINITION) AND NET WORTH PER CAPITA 
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Low-Income Economies [GNIpc < 905 US$] (Mean 60.41%; Variance 0.0022)
Lower-Middle-Income Economies [905US$ < GDPpc < 3595US$] (Mean 59.94%; Variance 0.0045)
Upper-Middle-Income Economies [3596US$ < GDPpc < 11115US$] (Mean 61.21%; Variance 0.0050)
High-Income Economies [GNIpc > 11116US$] (Mean 66.67%; Variance 0.0006)
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007) and Davies et al. (2006) (WIDER UNU Project on World 
Wealth Distribution). See Annex A for details. 
























































When the middle class (full country sample) is broken-down in lower middle and upper 
middle classes the corresponding relation with per capita income is stronger (higher coefficients of 
correlation) for the lower middle class (a correlation of 0.42) than for the upper middle class (a 
correlation of 0.23, see Table 2). This suggests that economic growth should benefit more people 
whose incomes are closer to poverty than those whose incomes closer to the rich. Growth is, in a 
sense, pro-lower middle class.13 From a political economy perspective we may think in a broader 
coalition between the poor and the lower middle class as their interests are relatively aligned 
among them. 
Inequality 
Let us turn now to the relationship between the middle class and inequality of income and wealth. 
The coefficients of correlation between the share of the middle class and the GINI coefficients for 
income and net wealth are negative for the whole sample and for all income groups (see Table 2). 
Furthermore, this negative correlation is higher for the income GINI (a coefficient of minus 0.94) 
than for the net wealth GINI (a coefficient of minus 0.67), suggesting a closer inverse relationship 
between shares of the middle class and the degree of inequality of income than for inequality of net 
wealth.14 In turn, the latter has a larger dispersion (see Figure 4 compared to Figure 5). It is also 
interesting to note that the negative correlation with the GINIs is stronger for the lower middle 
class than for the upper middle class (see Table 2). 
FIGURE 4 
THE MIDDLE CLASS (BROAD DEFINITION) AND INCOME GINI INDEX 


















Source: own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007). See Annex A for details. 
                                                     
13
 The coefficient of correlation between the broad definition of the middle class and the lower middle class is higher than the 
corresponding correlation with the upper middle class, see Table 2.  
14
 It is also worth mentioning that there is also a negative correlation between the income share of the rich (top 10 percent) and the 
level of per capita income of the country for the overall sample. 
























































THE MIDDLE CLASS (BROAD DEFINITION) AND NET WORTH GINI INDEX 






























Source: own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007) and Davies et al. (2006) [WIDER-UNU 
Project on World Wealth Distribution]. See Annex A for details. 
 
These results confirm our presumption that more unequal societies (those with higher GINI 
for income and net wealth) have smaller middle classes (relatively speaking) than more equal 
economies (those economies with lower GINIs).15  
Unlike the relation between the share of middle class and the level of per capita income the 
relation between the MC share and the GINI holds robust across all per capita income groups 
although the correlation between the MC shares and the income and wealth GINIs decline for the 
high income group (see Table B.4 in Annex B). 
The middle class and the level and composition of government 
expenditure 
For a sample of 93 countries (see Table 2) we find a correlation of 0.36 between the share of the 
middle class (broad definition) and the ratio of the level of total public spending over GDP, as our 
proxy to the size of the state. This suggests a not too strong correlation between both variables. 
Moreover, this correlation is weaker and more unstable for various country groups, even for high 
income countries. This may reflect our imperfect measure of size of government and/or simply that 
both variables are not strongly correlated. Further test of the relationship could be made using data 
on public employment (as share of total employment) and the share of the middle class. When we 
disaggregate the middle class in lower and upper middle we find a stronger correlation with the 
public spending to GDP ratio for the lower middle class than for the upper middle class (see Table 2 and 
Figure 6). 
                                                     
15
  These countries happen to be those with higher per capita income levels.   
CEPAL - Serie Macroeconomía del desarrollo No 65 The middle class and the development process 
20 
FIGURE 6 
THE MIDDLE CLASS (BROAD DEFINITION) AND GOVERNMENT EXPENSES 
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Low-Income Economies [GNIpc < 905 US$] (Mean 60.41%; Variance 0.0022)
Lower-Middle-Income Economies [905US$ < GDPpc < 3595US$] (Mean 59.94%; Variance 0.0045)
Upper-Middle-Income Economies [3596US$ < GDPpc < 11115US$] (Mean 61.21%; Variance 0.0050)
High-Income Economies [GNIpc > 11116US$] (Mean 66.67%; Variance 0.0006)
 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007). See Annex A for details. 
 
In order to explore the effects of the composition of public expenditure using the data from 
the Government Financial Statistics compiled by the IMF we find for the whole sample (see Table 
3) that in general social expenditure is not very progressive. For example government spending in 
education has a positive correlation only with the top decile. This is probably influenced by the 
expenditure in tertiary education that is known not to reach middle and lower income groups in a 
significant way. Also public expenditure in health has some correlation with the upper middle class 
and the rich (defined as the top decile). The only item that has some more significant correlation 
with the non-rich is the category of social protection. 
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TABLE 3 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND THE MIDDLE CLASS 
(Matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 129 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor (Deciles 
1 and 2) 
Middle Class 
(Broad Definition, 
Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class (Deciles 
3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class (Deciles 
7 to 9) 
Rich (Top 
Decile) 
1 000         Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) (129)      
0 807 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (129) (129)     
0 927 0 956 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (129) (129) (129)    
0 217 0 723 0 489 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (129) (129) (129) (129)   
-0 891 -0 987 -0 986 -0 615 1 000 
Income 
shares 
Rich (Top Decile) (129) (129) (129) (129) (129) 
0 137 0 028 0 087 -0 117 -0 059 Total Government Outlays (84) (84) (84) (84) (84) 
-0 069 -0 266 -0 181 -0 352 0 220 Housing and Community 
Amenities (70) (70) (70) (70) (70) 
-0 143 -0 064 -0 102 0 064 0 090 Health (70) (70) (70) (70) (70) 
-0 114 -0 093 -0 101 -0 026 0 102 Education (70) (70) (70) (70) (70) 
0 364 0 425 0 424 0 222 -0 424 
Social 
Expenditure 
Social Protection (70) (70) (70) (70) (70) 
0 150 0 058 0 121 -0 150 -0 088 Public Order and Safety (42) (42) (42) (42) (42) 
0 127 0 000 0 074 -0 187 -0 038 Economic Affairs (70) (70 ) (70) (70) (70) 
0 151 0.051 0.035 0 086 -0 073 Environmental Protection (6) (6) (6) (6) (6) 
0 290 0 204 0 260 -0 036 -0 238 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (69) (69) (69) (69) (69) 
0 115 0 061 0 087 -0 037 -0 079 General Public Services (70) (70) (70) (70) (70) 
0 080 0 057 0 083 -0 036 -0 066 
Other 
Expenditure Defense (70) (70) (70) (70) (70) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
 
When the same calculations are done for country groupings according to income levels and 
regional groupings the incidence does not change in a significant way. On the whole the incidence 
of social expenditure in education, health and housing is not redistributive neither to the poor nor to 
the lower middle class (see Tables C for country correlations by income group, and Tables D for 
country correlations by region, in Annexes C and D, respectively). 
The small and medium size enterprises and the middle class  
Our results show a weak correlation and of the unexpected sign between the shares of SME (Small 
and Medium-Size Enterprises) in employment and output and the share of the MC using both the 
broad definition of the middle class and the upper and lower middle class classifications. This may 
reflect also our more limited country sample for which SME data is available or other factors that 
would require additional research. 
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FIGURE 7 
THE MIDDLE CLASS (BROAD DEFINITION) AND SME’S EMPLOYMENT 
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Low-Income Economies [GNIpc < 905 US$] (Mean 62.04%; Variance 0.0019)
Lower-Middle-Income Economies [905US$ < GDPpc < 3595US$] (Mean 60.27%; Variance 0.0034)
Upper-Middle-Income Economies [3596US$ < GDPpc < 11115US$] (Mean 61.40%; Variance 0.0050)
High-Income Economies [GNIpc > 11116US$] (Mean 66.76%; Variance 0.0006)
 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007) and Ayyagari et al. (2005) 
[SME Database] See Annex A for details. 
FIGURE 8 
THE MIDDLE CLASS (BROAD DEFINITION) AND SME’S OUTPUT 
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Low-Income Economies [GNIpc < 905 US$] (Mean 62.95%; Variance 0.0000)
Lower-Middle-Income Economies [905US$ < GDPpc < 3595US$] (Mean 59.64%; Variance 0.0040)
Upper-Middle-Income Economies [3596US$ < GDPpc < 11115US$] (Mean 63.83%; Variance 0.0032)
High-Income Economies [GNIpc > 11116US$] (Mean 67.65%; Variance 0.0003)
 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007) and Ayyagari et al. (2005) 
[SME Database]. See Annex A for details. 
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Democracy 
To test the relationship between democracy and the share of the middle class we use a democracy 
index produced by the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). This index--running from 0 
to 10 (the higher the index the more democratic is society)-- comprises three dimensions: (a) 
competitiveness of political participation, (b) the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment and (c) constraints on the chief executive and guarantees on civil liberties for all 
citizens. Here democracy is considered as a variable that encompasses several degrees of 
democratic (or undemocratic rule) rather than as a simple dichotomy of, say, between democracy 
versus autocracy. As shown in Table 1, the average score of the index is low for low-income and 
lower-middle income countries (a value below 1), and much higher for upper middle income 
countries (a value of 7.8) and for higher-income countries (a value of 9.5). For the overall sample 
the correlation with the share of the middle class (broad definition) is almost non-existent (0.025, 
see Table 2). Only for the group of high-income countries there is a positive and relatively high 
correlation between the share of the MC and the democracy index (see Figure 9 and Table B.4 in 
Annex B).    
FIGURE 9 
THE MIDDLE CLASS (BROAD DEFINITION) AND DEMOCRACY 
(123 selected countries, closest year 2000 available data) 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank’s WDI (2007) and Marshall and Jaggers (2005) [Polity IV 
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Upper-Middle-Income Economies [3596US$ < GDPpc < 11115US$] High-Income Economies [GNIpc > 11116US$]
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IV. Concluding remarks 
This paper has investigated some of the main empirical regularities of 
behavior of the middle class across developing and high-income countries. 
Our paper suggests that as income per capita levels increase and the level 
of development rises countries tend to have a larger middle class and 
lower inequality, a large sector of small and medium size enterprises, 
stable democracies and in several (but not all) cases a larger government. 
The paper examines a set of variables that are correlated with the 
evolution of the income shares of the middle class using information for a 
large sample of countries. Our results show that in high income economies 
the relative size of the middle class (using a broad definition of deciles 3 to 
9) is near 6 percentage points higher than the share of the middle class in 
low income countries, suggesting a positive relationship between the level 
of economic development measured by per capita income levels and the 
share of the middle class. However, the relationship between the share in 
income of the middle class and the level of per capita income is non-linear 
and shows more dispersion for low and middle income countries with per 
capita incomes below US$ 10,000 than for rich economies. The 
relationship between the share of the middle class and net wealth is also 
positive but displays more dispersion than the relationship between the 
middle class shares and income per head.   
Interestingly, the income-middle class relation with per capita 
income is stronger (higher coefficients of correlation) for the lower 
middle class than for the upper middle class. From a political economy 
perspective we may think in a broader coalition between the poor and 
the lower middle class as their economic interests are relatively 
aligned among them. That coalition would range for individuals from 
the deciles 1 to 6.  
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Our results also show that countries with more unequal income and wealth distribution have 
smaller middle classes in relative terms, suggesting a negative relationship between the degree of 
inequality of income and wealth and the size of the middle class. The correlation between the share 
of the middle class and income GINIs is negative and close to 95 percent and the correlation with 
wealth GINIs is around 67 percent (full sample of 129 countries). The relation between this share 
and the GINI holds high across all per capita income groups although it is lower for high income 
economies with per capita incomes above US$ 11,000 reflecting the fact that rich countries are also 
less unequal than lower income nations.   
The paper also shows that the correlation between the share of the middle class and the 
overall size of government, in general, is not very strong and varies across countries ordered by 
income per capita levels. Moreover, the data of composition of public expenditure reveals that 
categories of social expenditure such as education, health and perhaps housing are in general not 
very redistributive reaching in small proportions the lower middle class and the poor. The 
component whose incidence is more progressive is social protection. Likewise we do not detect any 
significant correlation between the relative size of the small and medium size enterprises measured 
both as shares of total employment and total output and the shares of the middle class in real 
income. Finally, when we correlate an index of democracy and the middle class shares we find 
little or no correlation between both variables except for the group of high-income economies 
groups.  
Our analysis is cast in terms of correlation rather than causality as it is apparent a two–way 
interaction between social structures and income distribution on the one hand and economic and 
political economy variables such as income and wealth per capita levels, inequality, size of 
government and the SME sector, and degree of democracy on the other. To what extent is the 
middle class that leads the process of economic development or rather it follows (or evolve jointly) 
with it is still an open question for further research. 
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Annex A 
Description of variables and country classification 
Note: Gathered data on income distribution is the closest to year 2000 available information. 
Details on the corresponding date for each country is available on request from the author. 
A.1. Description of variables 
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2): Data on deciles comes from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI), version 2007, for selected years. 
Middle Class (Broad Definition, Deciles 3 to 9): Data on deciles comes from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI), version 2007, for selected years. See the database in 
Annex C. 
Lower-Middle Class (Deciles 3 to 6): Data on deciles comes from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI), version 2007, for selected years. 
Upper-Middle Class (Deciles 7 to 9): Data on deciles comes from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI), version 2007, for selected years. 
Rich (Top Decile): Data on deciles comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI), version 2007, for selected years. 
GDP per capita (PPP adjusted): is the Gross Domestic Product per capita adjusted by the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for international US$ of year 2000. Data comes from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), version 2007, for selected years. 
Income GINI Index: the numerator is the area between the Lorenz Curve of the distribution and 
the uniform distribution line; the denominator is the area under the uniform distribution 
line. Data comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), version 
2007, for selected years. 
Net Worth per capita (PPP adjusted): is the Wealth per capita adjusted by the Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP) for international US$ of year 2000. Here wealth is defined as Net Worth, v.g. 
the value of physical and financial assets less liabilities. Data comes from the World 
Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-
WIDER) study “The World Distribution of Household Wealth” (Davies et al., 2006). 
Net Worth GINI Index: is a measure of wealth inequality. It is defined as a ratio with values 
between 0 and 1: the numerator is the area between the Lorenz Curve of the net worth 
distribution and the uniform distribution line; the denominator is the area under the 
uniform distribution line. Data comes from the World Institute for Development 
Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER) study “The World 
Distribution of Household Wealth” (Davies et al., 2006). 
Government Expenses (% of GDP): are cash payments for operating activities of the government 
in providing goods and services. They include compensation of employees (such as wages 
and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and other expenses such as rent 
and dividends. Data on deciles comes from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI), version 2007, for selected years. 
Democracy Index (Polity IV): corresponds to the Institutionalized Democracy Indicator form 
Polity IV Project. The indicator of democracy is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10), 
derived from the codes of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and 
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competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. Data 
comes from Polity IV Project (Center for Global Policy, George Mason University) study 
“Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004” (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2005). 
SME’s Employment (% of total employment): is the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) 
sector’s share of formal employment using the official country definition of SME. Values 
are 1990-1999 averages for each country. Data comes from the study “Small and Medium 
Enterprises across the Globe” (Ayyagari et al., 2005).  
SME’s Output (% of GDP): is the SME sector’s contribution to GDP using the official country 
definition of SME. Values are 1990-1999 averages for each country. Data comes from the 
study “Small and Medium Enterprises across the Globe” (Ayyagari et al., 2005). 
Total Outlays (% of GDP): represent government expenses plus the net acquisition of 
nonfinancial assets (acquisitions minus disposals) by the public sector. Data reported in 
cash-based budgetary central government, in current local currency unit comes from the 
IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 7, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP based on own 
calculations. 
Housing and Community Amenities (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities 
of the budgetary central government related to housing development; community 
development; water supply; street lighting; research and development in housing and 
community amenities; and other housing and community amenities payments not elsewhere 
classified. Data in current local currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 
706, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP based on own calculations. 
Health (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the budgetary central 
government related to medical products, appliances, and equipment; outpatient services; 
hospital services; public health services; research and development in health; and other 
health payments not elsewhere classified. Data in current local currency unit comes from 
the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 707, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP based on 
own calculations. 
Education (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the budgetary central 
government related to pre-primary and primary education; secondary education; 
postsecondary nontertiary education; tertiary education; education not definable by level; 
subsidiary services to education; research and development in education; and other 
education payments not elsewhere classified. Data in current local currency unit comes 
from the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 709, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP 
based on own calculations. 
Social Protection (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the budgetary 
central government related to sickness and disability; old age; survivors; family and 
children; unemployment; housing; social exclusion not elsewhere classified; research and 
development in social protection; and other social protection payments not elsewhere 
classified. Data in current local currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 
710, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP based on own calculations. 
Public Order and Safety (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the 
budgetary central government related to police services; fire protection services; law 
courts; prisons; research and development in public order and safety; and other public 
order and safety payments not elsewhere classified. Data in current local currency unit 
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comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 703, for selected years. We express it as % of 
GDP based on own calculations. 
Economic Affairs (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the budgetary 
central government related to general economic, commercial, and labor affairs; agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, and hunting; fuel and energy; mining, manufacturing, and construction; 
transport; communication; other industries; research and development in economic affairs; 
and other economic affairs payments not elsewhere classified. Data in current local 
currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 704, for selected years. We express 
it as % of GDP based on own calculations. 
Environmental Protection (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the 
budgetary central government related to waste management; waste water management; 
pollution abatement; protection of biodiversity and landscape; research and development in 
environmental protection; and other environmental protection payments not elsewhere 
classified. Data in current local currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 
705, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP based on own calculations. 
Recreation, Culture, and Religion (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of 
the budgetary central government related to recreational and sporting services; cultural 
services; broadcasting and publishing services; religious and other community services; 
research and development in recreation, culture, and religion; and other recreation, culture, 
and religion payments not elsewhere classified. Data in current local currency unit comes 
from the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 708, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP 
based on own calculations. 
General Public Services (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the 
budgetary central government related to executive and legislative organs, financial and 
fiscal affairs, external affairs; foreign economic aid; general services; basic research; 
research and development general public services; public debt transactions; transfers of a 
general character between different levels of government; and other general public services 
not elsewhere classified. Data in current local currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS 
(2003), Code 701, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP bases on own 
calculations. 
Defense (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the budgetary central 
government related to military defense; civil defense; foreign military aid; research and 
development in defense; and other defense payments not elsewhere classified. Data in 
current local currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), Code 702, for selected 
years. We express it as % of GDP bases on own calculations. 
Social Expenditure (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the budgetary 
central government related to housing and community amenities, health, education, and 
social protection. Data in current local currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), as 
a sum of Codes 706, 707, 709, and 710, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP 
bases on own calculations. 
Non-Social Expenditure (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the 
budgetary central government related to public order and safety, economic affairs, 
environmental protection, and recreation, culture, and religion. Data in current local 
currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), as a sum of Codes 703, 704, 705, and 
708, for selected years. We express it as % of GDP bases on own calculations. 
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Other Expenditure (% of GDP): are the cash payments for operating activities of the budgetary 
central government related to general public services and defense. Data in current local 
currency unit comes from the IMF’s GFS (2003), as a sum of Codes 701 and 702, for 
selected years. We express it as % of GDP bases on own calculations. 
A.2. Country Classification 
Income Grouping: countries are grouped according to their Gross National Income per capita 
(GNIpc) using the World Bank’s criterion: 
Low-Income Economies: GNIpc ≤ 905 US$  
Included countries: Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African 
Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, 
India, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Republic of Yemen, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
Lower-Middle-Income Economies: 906 US$ ≤ GNIpc ≤ 3,595 US$  
Included countries: Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Republic 
of Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Lesotho, Macedonia (FYR), Moldova, Morocco, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine. 
Upper-Middle-Income Economies: 3,596 US$ ≤ GNIpc ≤ 11,115 US$  
Included countries: Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovak Republic, South Africa, St. Lucia, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Venezuela (RB). 
High-Income Economies: GNIpc ≥ 11,116 US$  
Included countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, United 
States. 
Regional Grouping: countries are grouped according to the World Bank’s criterion. We re-group 
Europe and Central Asia together with North America due to the similarities in 
organization and economies. We also disaggregate this new region (called Europe, Central 
Asia and North America) by two different criterions: based on OECD Membership, and 
based on European Union Membership. The countries included in each region are the 
following: 
East Asia and Pacific:  
Australia, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam. 
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Europe, Central Asia and North America: 
By OECD Membership: 
OECD Countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United 
States. 
Non-OECD Countries: 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia (FYR), Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan. 
By European Union Membership: 
EU Members: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
Others: 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Macedonia (FYR), Moldova, Norway, Russian Federation, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United 
States, Uzbekistan. 
Latin America and The Caribbean: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela (RB). 
Middle East and North Africa:  
Algeria, Arab Republic of Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Republic of Yemen. 
South Asia: 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. 
Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Annex B 
Middle class and correlates, by country income groups 
 
TABLE B.1 
MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS FOR LOW INCOME ECONOMIES 
(selected indicators for 38 countries, year 2000 closest available information,  




(Deciles 1 and 2) 
Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000   Poor 
(Deciles 1 and 2) (38)   
0 696 1 000  Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 9) (38) (38)  
-0 832 -0 977 1 000 
Mean Income 
Holdings 
(% of GDP) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) (38) (38) (38) 
0 105 -0 082 0 033 GDP per capita  
(PPP adjusted) (38) (38) (38) 
-0 942 -0 888 0 963 
Income GINI Index (38) (38) (38) 
0 229 0 050 -0 106 Net Worth per capita  
(PPP adjusted) (38) (38) (38) 
-0 675 -0 655 0 705 
Income and 
Wealth 
Net Worth GINI Index (38) (38) (38) 
-0 310 -0 136 0 192 Government Expenses 
(% of GDP) (15) (15) (15) 
0 067 0 006 -0 025 Democracy Index 
(Polity IV) (38) (38) (38) 
0 584 0 455 -0 504 SME's Employment 
(% of total employment) (11) (11) (11) 
. . . 
Other Indicators 
SME's Output (% of GDP) 
(  ) (  ) (  ) 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007), Davies et al. (2006) [WIDER-UNU Project on 
World Wealth Distribution], Marshall and Jaggers (2005) [Polity IV Project], and Ayyagari et al. (2005) [SME's 
Database]. See Annex A for details 
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TABLE B.2 
MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS FOR LOWER MIDDLE INCOME ECONOMIES 
(selected indicators for 37 countries, year 2000 closest available information, GNI per capita 




(Deciles 1 and 2) 
Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000   Poor 
(Deciles 1 and 2) (37)   
0 822 1 000  Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 9) (37) (37)  
-0 900 -0 988 1 000 
Mean Income 
Holdings 
(% of GDP) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) (37) (37) (37) 
-0 125 -0 139 0 141 GDP per capita  
(PPP adjusted) (36) (36) (36) 
-0 959 -0 947 0 984 
Income GINI Index (37) (37) (37) 
0 150 0 158 -0 162 Net Worth per capita  
(PPP adjusted) (37) (37) (37) 
-0 649 -0 744 0 746 
Income and 
Wealth 
Net Worth GINI Index (37) (37) (37) 
0 135 0 085 -0 105 Government Expenses 
(% of GDP) (28) (28) (28) 
-0 080 -0 184 0 162 Democracy Index 
(Polity IV) (37) (37) (37) 
-0 398 -0 443 0 441 SME's Employment 
(% of total employment) (16) (16) (16) 
-0 834 -0 575 0 672 
Other Indicators 
SME's Output 
(% of GDP) (7) (7) (7) 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007), Davies et al. (2006) [WIDER-UNU Project on 
World Wealth Distribution], Marshall and Jaggers (2005) [Polity IV Project], and Ayyagari et al. (2005) [SME's 
Database]. See Annex A for details 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicates the number of observations available for estimating the particular 
correlation 
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TABLE B.3 
MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS FOR UPPER MIDDLE INCOME ECONOMIES 
(Selected indicators for 24 countries, year 2000 closest available information, GNI per capita 




(Deciles 1 and 2) 
Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000   Poor 
(Deciles 1 and 2) (24)   
0 900 1 000  Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 9) (24) (24)  
-0 942 -0 994 1 000 
Mean Income 
Holdings 
(% of GDP) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) (24) (24) (24) 
0 226 0 111 -0 141 GDP per capita  
(PPP adjusted) (23) (23) (23) 
-0 975 -0 971 0 990 
Income GINI Index (24) (24) (24) 
0 017 -0 053 0 037 Net Worth per capita 
(PPP adjusted) (24) (24) (24) 
-0 934 -0 898 0 924 
Income and 
Wealth 
Net Worth GINI Index (24) (24) (24) 
0 587 0 416 -0 467 Government Expenses 
(% of GDP) (22) (22) (22) 
-0 172 -0 153 0 160 Democracy Index  
(Polity IV) (23) (23) (23) 
-0 541 -0 598 0 591 SME's Employment  
(% of total employment) (17) (17) (17) 
-0 087 -0 121 0 112 
Other Indicators 
SME's Output (% of GDP) 
(9) (9) (9) 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007), Davies et al. (2006) [WIDER-UNU Project on World 
Wealth Distribution], Marshall and Jaggers (2005) [Polity IV Project], and Ayyagari et al. (2005) [SME's Database]. 
See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicates the number of observations available for estimating the particular 
correlation. 
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TABLE B.4 
MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS FOR HIGH INCOME ECONOMIES 
(selected indicators for 30 high income countries, year 2000 closest available information, GNI per capita 
greater than 11,115 US$) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor 
(Deciles 1 and 2) 
Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000   Poor 
(Deciles 1 and 2) (30)   
0 584 1 000  Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 9) (30) (30)  
-0 834 -0 935 1 000 
Mean Income 
Holdings 
(% of GDP) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) (30) (30) (30) 
0 201 0 129 -0 176 GDP per capita 
(PPP adjusted) (30) (30) (30) 
-0 939 -0 775 0 937 
Income GINI Index 
(30) (30) (30) 
-0 275 -0 322 0 339 Net Worth per capita  
(PPP adjusted) (30) (30) (30) 
-0 320 -0 208 0 281 
Income and 
Wealth 
Net Worth GINI Index 
(30) (30) (30) 
0 204 0 146 -0 191 Government Expenses 
(% of GDP) (28) (28) (28) 
0 346 0 458 -0 467 Democracy Index  
(Polity IV) (28) (28) (28) 
0 065 0 017 -0 039 SME's Employment 
(% of total employment) (28) (28) (28) 
-0 021 -0 285 0 187 
Other Indicators 
SME's Output (% of GDP) 
(18) (18) (18) 
Source: own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007), Davies et al. (2006) [WIDER-UNU Project on World 
Wealth Distribution], Marshall and Jaggers (2005) [Polity IV Project], and Ayyagari et al. (2005) [SME's Database]. 
See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicates the number of observations available for estimating the particular 
correlation. 
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Annex C  




COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN LOW-INCOME  
ECONOMIES FOR LOW INCOME ECONOMIES 
(matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 38 countries, year 2000 closest available information,  
GNI per capita less than 905 US$) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor 




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class  
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(38)      
0 696 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (38) (38)     
0 906 0 910 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (38) (38) (38)    
-0 004 0 684 0 320 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (38) (38) (38) (38)   





Rich (Top Decile) 
(38) (38) (38) (38) (38) 
-0 222 0 002 -0 103 0 198 0 061 
Total Government Outlays 
(20) (20) (20) (20) (20) 
0 186 -0 102 -0 019 -0 221 0 027 Housing and Community 
Amenities (13) (13) (13) (13) (13) 
-0 514 -0 226 -0 401 0 193 0 320 
Health 
(13) (13) (13) (13) (13) 
-0 435 -0 054 -0 245 0 333 0 162 
Education 
(13) (13) (13) (13) (13) 




(13) (13) (13) (13) (13) 
0 326 0 068 0 153 -0 178 -0 153 
Public Order and Safety 
(11) (11) (11) (11) (11) 
0 026 0 113 0 067 0 158 -0 098 
Economic Affairs 
(13) (13) (13) (13) (13) 
. . . . . Environmental 
Protection (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 
0 255 0 494 0 404 0 491 -0 456 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
-0 322 -0 258 -0 324 -0 034 0 294 
General Public Services 
(13) (13) (13) (13) (13) 




(13) (13) (13) (13) (13) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's criterion. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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TABLE C.2 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN 
 LOWER-MIDDLE-INCOME ECONOMIES 
(matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 37 countries, year 2000 closest available information,  
GNI per capita between 906 US$ and 3,595 US$) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor 




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class  
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(37)      
0 822 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (37) (37)     
0 937 0 958 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (37) (37) (37)    
0 284 0 759 0 541 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (37) (37) (37) (37)   




Rich (Top Decile) 
(37) (37) (37) (37) (37) 
0 062 -0 229 -0 127 -0 362 0 163 
Total Government Outlays 
(26) (26) (26) (26) (26) 
0 141 -0 143 0 009 -0 437 0 059 Housing and Community 
Amenities (22) (22) (22) (22) (22) 
-0 047 -0 146 -0 094 -0 186 0 120 
Health 
(22) (22) (22) (22) (22) 
-0 128 -0 146 -0 163 -0 012 0 144 
Education 
(22) (22) (22) (22) (22) 




(22) (22) (22) (22) (22) 
-0 043 -0 173 -0 071 -0 391 0 129 
Public Order and Safety 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
-0 074 -0 259 -0 180 -0 296 0 210 
Economic Affairs 
(22) (22) (22) (22) (22) 
0 998 0 966 0 989 0 881 -0 977 
Environmental Protection 
(3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
0 361 0 225 0 312 -0 132 -0 278 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (22) (22) (22) (22) (22) 
0 349 0 219 0 278 -0 063 -0 272 
General Public Services 
(22) (22) (22) (22) (22) 




(22) (22) (22) (22) (22) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following 
World Bank's criterion. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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TABLE C.3 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS  
IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME ECONOMIES 
(matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 24 countries, year 2000 closest available information,  
GNI per capita between 3, 596 US$ and 11,115 US$) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor  




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class (Deciles 
3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class (Deciles 
7 to 9) 
Rich (Top 
Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(24)      
0 900 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (24) (24)     
0 960 0 974 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (24) (24) (24)    
0 493 0 797 0 639 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (24) (24) (24) (24)   




Rich (Top Decile) 
(24) (24) (24) (24) (24) 
0 206 -0 028 0 091 -0 354 -0 031 
Total Government Outlays 
(20) (20) (20) (20) (20) 
-0 291 -0 554 -0 412 -0 748 0 498 Housing and Community 
Amenities (18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 
0 149 0 089 0 159 -0 125 -0 107 
Health 
(18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 
-0 096 -0 285 -0 166 -0 506 0 242 
Education 
(18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 




(18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 
0 132 0 049 0 105 -0 106 -0 070 
Public Order and Safety 
(15) (15) (15) (15) (15) 
0 321 0 040 0 231 -0 479 -0 114 
Economic Affairs 
(18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 
. . . . . 
Environmental Protection 
(  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 
0 605 0 342 0 510 -0 213 -0 418 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 
0 035 0 032 0 051 -0 029 -0 033 
General Public Services 
(18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 




(18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's criterion. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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TABLE C.4 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN HIGH INCOME 
 ECONOMIES 
(matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 30 high income countries, year 2000 closest available 
information, GNI per capita greater than 11,115 US$) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor  




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(30)      
0 584 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (30) (30)     
0 870 0 880 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (30) (30) (30)    
-0 650 0 157 -0 330 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (30) (30) (30) (30)   




Rich (Top Decile) 
(30) (30) (30) (30) (30) 
0 087 0 314 0 190 0 175 -0 240 
Total Government Outlays 
(18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 
-0 079 -0 182 -0 216 0 151 0 152 Housing and Community 
Amenities (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) 
-0 492 -0 479 -0 536 0 324 0 533 
Health 
(17) (17) (17) (17) (17) 
-0 054 0 240 0 070 0 300 -0 127 
Education 
(17) (17) (17) (17) (17) 




(17) (17) (17) (17) (17) 
-0 028 0 257 0 210 0 032 -0 156 
Public Order and Safety 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
0 055 0 212 0 150 0 061 -0 160 
Economic Affairs 
(17) (17) (17) (17) (17) 
. . . . . 
Environmental Protection 
(  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 
0 046 0 023 0 056 -0 087 -0 036 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (17) (17) (17) (17) (17) 
0 209 0 472 0 335 0 128 -0 395 
General Public Services 
(17) (17) (17) (17) (17) 




(17) (17) (17) (17) (17) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's criterion. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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Annex D 
Composition of public expenditure and middle class, by region 
TABLE D.1 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC 
(Matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 16 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor  




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(16)      
0 673 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (16) (16)     
0 860 0 942 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (16) (16) (16)    
-0 175 0 566 0 258 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (16) (16) (16) (16)   





Rich (Top Decile) 
(16) (16) (16) (16) (16) 
0 013 0 034 0 030 0 027 -0 029 
Total Government Outlays 
(12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
0 646 0 279 0 442 -0 424 -0 413 Housing and Community 
Amenities (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) 
-0 145 0 058 -0 036 0 310 0 004 
Health 
(10) (10) (10) (10) (10) 
-0 215 -0 188 -0 186 -0 063 0 207 
Education 
(10) (10) (10) (10) (10) 




(11) (11) (11) (11) (11) 
-0 085 -0 224 -0 098 -0 511 0 195 
Public Order and Safety 
(7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
-0 290 -0 119 -0 186 0 173 0 180 
Economic Affairs 
(10) (10) (10) (10) (10) 
. . . . . 
Environmental Protection 
(  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 
0 120 0 224 0 179 0 213 -0 203 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) 
0 051 -0 217 -0 120 -0 374 0 143 
General Public Services (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) 
-0.264 0 078 -0 044 0 405 0 027 
Other 
Expenditure 
Defense (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's Regional criterion plus OECD classification. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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TABLE D.2 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN EUROPE,  
CENTRAL ASIA & NORTH AMERICA: OECD MEMBERS 
(Matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 18 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor 




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich  
(Top Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(18)      
0 504 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (18) (18)     
0 867 0 816 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (18) (18) (18)    
-0 569 0 342 -0 263 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (18) (18) (18) (18)   





Rich (Top Decile) 
(18) (18) (18) (18) (18) 
0 463 0 698 0 645 0 071 -0 682 
Total Government Outlays (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
-0 136 0 523 0 198 0 624 -0 302 Housing and Community 
Amenities (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
-0 225 -0 633 -0 412 -0 394 0 535 
Health 
(7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
0 218 0 658 0 488 0 284 -0 549 
Education 
(7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 




(7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
-1 000 -1 000 -1 000 -1 000 1 000 
Public Order and Safety 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
0 459 0 475 0 462 -0 026 -0 528 
Economic Affairs 
(7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
. . . . . 
Environmental Protection 
(  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 
0 524 0 823 0 875 -0 198 -0 798 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
0 271 0 714 0 516 0 338 -0 611 
General Public Services 
(7) ( 7 ) (7) (7) (7) 




(7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's Regional criterion and OECD membership. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. We group 
Europe & Central Asia together with North America due to small sample of North America (2 countries), and then we 
regroup them among OECD and Non-OECD countries. 
CEPAL - Serie Macroeconomía del desarrollo No 65 The middle class and the development process 
46 
TABLE D.3 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS 
IN EUROPE, CENTRAL ASIA & NORTH AMERICA: NON-OECD COUNTRIES 
(Matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 29 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor 




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich  
(Top Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(29)      
0 768 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (29) (29)     
0 890 0 952 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (29) (29) (29)    
-0 220 0 346 0 041 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (29) (29) (29) (29)   




Rich (Top Decile) 
(29) (29) (29) (29) (29) 
0 242 0 148 0 199 -0 121 -0 191 
Total Government Outlays 
(21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 
0 279 0 300 0 284 0 097 -0 310 Housing and Community 
Amenities (21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 
0 017 0 120 0 096 0 090 -0 089 
Health 
(21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 
0 487 0 331 0 447 -0 282 -0 407 
Education 
(21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 




(21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 
-0 066 -0 007 -0 065 0 175 0 027 
Public Order and Safety 
(15) (15) (15) (15) (15) 
0 532 0 419 0 553 -0 316 -0 484 
Economic Affairs 
(21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 
-1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 -1 000 
Environmental Protection 
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 
0 144 0 119 0 137 -0 032 -0 135 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 
-0 211 -0 144 -0 196 0 126 0177 
General Public Services 
(21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 




(21) (21) (21) (21) (21) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's Regional criterion and OECD membership. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. We group 
Europe & Central Asia together with North America due to small sample of North America (2 countries), and then we 
regroup them among OECD and Non-OECD countries. 
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TABLE D.4 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN  
(matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 23 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor 




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1.000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(23)      
0 700 1.000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (23) (23)     
0 880 0 938 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (23) (23) (23)    
0 281 0 864 0 634 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (23) (23) (23) (23)   




Rich (Top Decile) 
(23) (23) (23) (23) (23) 
0 597 0 553 0 600 0 288 -0 599 
Total Government Outlays (15) (15) (15) (15) (15) 
0 539 0 339 0 507 -0 025 -0 408 Housing and 
Community Amenities (12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
0 475 0 453 0 525 0 195 -0 485 
Health 
(12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
0 173 0 483 0 436 0 394 -0 435 
Education 
(12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 




(12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
0 378 0 179 0 327 -0 217 -0 281 Public Order and 
Safety (7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
0 548 0 236 0 429 -0 133 -0 327 
Economic Affairs 
(12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 -1 000 Environmental 
Protection (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 




and Religion (12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
0 575 0 355 0 441 0 108 -0 430 General Public 
Services (12) (12) (12  (12) (12) 




(12) (12) (12) (12) (12) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's Regional criterion and OECD membership. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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TABLE D.5 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN MIDDLE EAST 
AND NORTH AFRICA 
(Matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 8 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor (Deciles 




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich (Top 
Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(8)      
0 171 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (8) (8)     
0 768 0 756 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (8) (8) (8)    
-0 683 0 595 -0 075 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (8) (8) (8) (8)   




Rich (Top Decile) 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
0 121 0 810 0 606 0 490 -0 734 
Total Government Outlays (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
-0 290 -0 360 -0 389 -0 071 0 443 Housing and 
Community Amenities (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
-0 297 0 307 -0 002 0 471 -0 125 
Health 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
0 132 0 785 0 548 0 523 -0 715 
Education 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 




(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
-0 996 -0 984 -0 999 -0 338 0 988 Public Order and 
Safety (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
-0 251 -0 061 -0 129 0 066 0 162 
Economic Affairs 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
. . . . . Environmental 
Protection (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 




and Religion (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
0 298 -0 167 0 116 -0 397 -0 002 General Public 
Services (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 




(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's Regional criterion and OECD membership. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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TABLE D.6 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN SOUTH ASIA 
(Matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 5 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor  




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class  
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich  
(Top Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(5)      
0 930 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (5) (5)     
0 989 0 966 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (5) (5) (5)    
0 653 0 880 0 729 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (5) (5) (5) (5)   




Rich (Top Decile) 
(5) (5) (5) (5) (5) 
0 186 0 521 0 341 0 747 -0 452 
Total Government Outlays 
(4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
-0 807 -0 642 -0 800 -0 195 0 685 Housing and 
Community Amenities (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
-0 703 -0 355 -0 585 0 163 0 438 
Health 
(4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
-0 967 -0 813 -0 916 -0 433 0 861 
Education 
(4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 




(3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
. . . . . 
Public Order and Safety 
(  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 
-0 814 -0 549 -0 757 -0 028 0 614 
Economic Affairs 
(4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
. . . . . Environmental 
Protection (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 




and Religion (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) 
0 970 0 929 0 988 0 607 -0 951 
General Public Services 
(4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 




(4) (4) (4) (4) (4) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's Regional criterion and OECD membership. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation.  
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TABLE D.7 
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND MIDDLE CLASS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
(Matrix of correlations for selected indicators, 30 countries, year 2000 closest available information) 
Income Groups 
Cross Correlations Poor  




Deciles 3 to 9) 
Lower Middle 
Class  
(Deciles 3 to 6) 
Upper Middle 
Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) 
Rich 
(Top Decile) 
1 000         
Poor (Deciles 1 and 2) 
(30)      
0 759 1 000     Middle Class (Broad 
Definition, Deciles 3 to 9) (30) (30)     
0 924 0 931 1 000    Lower Middle Class 
(Deciles 3 to 6) (30) (30) (30)    
0 278 0 819 0 554 1 000   Upper Middle Class 
(Deciles 7 to 9) (30) (30) (30) (30)   




Rich (Top Decile) 
(30) (30) (30) (30) (30) 
-0 665 -0 802 -0 750 -0 776 0 795 
Total Government Outlays 
(16) (16) (16) (16) (16) 
-0 485 -0 830 -0 718 -0 838 0 781 Housing and Community 
Amenities (8) (8  (8) (8) (8) 
-0 579 -0 555 -0 610 -0 347 0 582 
Health 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
-0 580 -0 732 -0 699 -0 632 0 725 
Education 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 




(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
0 364 -0 187 0 104 -0 657 0 070 
Public Order and Safety 
(7) (7) (7) (7) (7) 
0 077 -0 331 -0 175 -0 518 0 248 
Economic Affairs 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
. . . . . 
Environmental Protection 
(  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) 
-0 411 -0 836 -0 668 -0 936 0 769 
Non-Social 
Expenditure 
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion (8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
-0 896 -0 652 -0 766 -0 325 0 735 
General Public Services 
(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 




(8) (8) (8) (8) (8) 
Source: Own elaboration based on World Bank's WDI (2007) and IMF's GFS 2003. Countries grouped following World 
Bank's Regional criterion and OECD membership. See Annex A for details. 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of observations available for estimating each correlation. 
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